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FOREWORD

THE COST-FACTOR IN HEALTH CARE
RICHARD

A. MCCORMICK, S.J.*

A simple case taken from the Hastings Center Report' can
serve to introduce my concerns in this foreword to the essays
in this volume.
An automobile crashes into a motorcyclist one block from a
for-profit hospital. The unconscious motorcyclist is rushed
to. the emergency room where a neurosurgeon diagnoses an
epidural hematoma that requires immediate surgery. But a
hospital administrator is unable to determine whether the
patient has health insurance and wants to transfer him to a
public hospital, on the opposite side of town. Should the
physician agree to the request for a transfer?
Here in microcosm is the cost-factor working its way into
the clinical setting and potentially affecting the life and well
being of an individual patient. In a sense, the physician is
caught between serving the patient and serving the common
good by reducing or limiting care. I say "microcosm" because at present, health care facilities are being asked - or
forced - into policies (macrocosm) that have an eye on both
constituencies, the patient and the common (economic) good.
That this situation is loaded with ethical problems is
clear from the studies in this volume. I will neither rehearse
nor attempt to answer such problems here. Rather I want to
provide an optique, a general ethical perspective on such
problems. I am convinced that ethics is much less about answer-giving than it is about value-raising. In this sense it may
be described as "corrective vision," an attempt to expose the
value-dimensions present in human conflicts and dilemmas * John A. O'Brien Professor of Christian Ethics, University of Notre
Dame.
1. Dyer, Patients, Not Costs, Come First, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5
(1986).
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especially those we are likely, in our often short-sighted enthusiasms, to overlook or downplay.
The Catholic moral tradition, from which I come and in
which I frankly revel, has approached these situations in a
somewhat unique way. It takes seriously the radical transformation of perspectives that has occurred in God's intervention into history through His Son, Jesus Christ. For the Catholic Christian this radical transformation is "The way things
are in this world." Thus Vatican II stated: "[F]aith throws a
new light on everything, manifests God's design for man's total vocation, and thus directs the mind to solutions which are
fully human. '"2
The Catholic moral tradition, however, refuses to view
such faith-sources as dispensations from human responsibility.
As St. Thomas stated: "He [human person] participates in
providence by providing for himself and others." 3 This
means, of course, that we are charged with the responsibility
of human intelligence and creativity.
Catholic tradition has attempted to combine these twin
sources of moral insight in the phrase reason informed by faith.
That is neither reason replaced by faith (a kind of fideism) nor
reason without faith (a kind of dreary rationalism). Reason informed by faith means that faith provides the context or
background for the exercise of human reflection. In this
sense it yields general perspectives that influence our insights
but do not preprogram our judgments.
There are many components of the Catholic moral vision
as this vision is at play in health care delivery. For instance, in
this vision life is a basic good - as the condition for all other
experiences - but not an absolute one. It is not absolute because there are higher goods for which life can be sacrificed
(glory of God, salvation of souls, service to one's brethren,
etc.). Thus, "[t]here is no greater love than this: to lay down
one's life for one's friend."" Laying down one's life is, after
Jesus' example, life's greatest fulfillment, even though it is
the end of life as we know it. We could word this judgment as
follows: death is an evil but not an unconditioned or absolute
one.
This value judgment has immediate relevance for care of
the ill and dying. It issues in a basic attitude or policy: not all
means must be used to preserve life. I do not wish to pursue
2. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, Gaudium et Spes no. 11 (1965).
3. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-II, Q.91, A.2c.
4. John 15:13 (New American).
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the further casuistic details of this judgment here. My sole
point is that Catholicism, in its religious sources, yields a perspective that forms the basis of a moral vision. It informs our
reasoning.
Let me address another component of this vision. In a
1953 address to the International Congress of Anesthesiologists Pius XII stated: "Life, health, all temporal activities are
in fact subordinated to spiritual ends."' In other words, there
are higher values than life in the living of it. There are also
higher values in the dying of it.
What are these "ends?" What is this "higher, more important good" to which Pius XII referred? One answer can
be given in terms of love of God and neighbor. Such love
sums up briefly the meaning, substance and consummation of
life. As Matthew puts it on the lips of Jesus: "On these two
commandments the whole law is based, and the prophets as
well." 6 One scarcely needs to belabor the point in the biblical
accounts. Charity is the epitome of the entire law. 7 It is more
elevated than all charisms.8 It is the bond of perfection. 9
What can easily be missed is that these two goods are not
separable. Our love of neighbor is in some real sense our love
of God. The good our love wants to do Him and to which He
enables us, can be done only for the neighbor. It is in others
that God demands to be recognized and loved. If this is true,
it means that in Christian perspective, the meaning, substance and consummation of life are found in human
relationships.
The primacy of human relationships in the Christian
moral vision does not solve concrete problems. But it does
shape our reason as we go about the messy work of problemsolving. It reminds us that welfare values (having things), important as they are, are subordinate to dignity values (being
regarded and treated justly, fairly, with respect, etc.). That is
why, for the Christian, "quality of life" refers primarily (not
exclusively) to dignity values.
Another component of the Catholic moral vision is our
essential sociality. In the Judeo-Christian story God relates to
and covenants with a people. As Christians, we live, move
and have our being as a group, an ecclesia. Our being in
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Pius XII, The Pope Speaks, 4, 45 (1957).
Matthew 22:40.
See, e.g., Galatians 5:14.
See, 1 Corinthians 13.
See, e.g., Colossians 3:14.
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Christ is a shared being. We are branches of the same vine,
sheep of the same shepherd.
This vision underscores our radical sociality and within
it, our essential equality regardless of functional importance.
These dimensions of our being powerfully suggest (faith informing reason) that our well being and the rights that protect
this flourishing cannot be conceived in isolation from others.
Furthermore, our radical equality should exercise a steadying
and restraining influence as we deliberate about the problems
of a just health care system.
More particularly the above dimensions that I have lifted
from the Christian story mean that beneficence must be tempered by autonomy (the good of the patient is not defined by
medical beneficence alone) and that efficiency must be tempered by justice (the good of patients is not defined by efficiency alone).
I have lifted out three components of the Christian story
to indicate how they can and should influence our insights,
shape our reasoning. I have done so in order to lay the
groundwork for a brief consideration of three contemporary
threats to this vision. These threats can have the effect of
blurring the Christian vision of who we are, where we come
from, what constitutes our good. In other words they can replace faith's shaping of reason with infecting elements.
I.

DEPERSONALIZATION

There are three factors at work in the way we perceive
and respond to health care problems. First, there is the
growth of technology. Everything from diagnosis through
acute care to billing is done by computer. Check the advertisements in any medical journal and it becomes clear that
medicine and the machine are wed. This gives efficiency but
inevitably some impersonality.
Second, there is cost and cost-containment. Spiraling
costs are due to many factors (e.g., sophistication of services,
higher wages, more personnel, cost pass-along systems, inflation). In 1976, for example, expenditures for health constituted 11.4 percent of the gross national product. Of this sum,
91 percent went into health care systems, 3 percent to human
biology, 1 percent to life style, 5 percent to environmental
factors. Obviously, the cost factor will force difficult decisions. Shall we rescind federal coverage of end-stage renal
disease? Must we eventually exclude some classes of infants
from neonatal intensive care?
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The third factor is the multiplication of what I will call
"public entities" in health care delivery. I mean attorneys,
courts, and legislatures. Thus we have legislated living wills;
we have had a series of trial cases: Quinlan, Saikewicz, Fox,
Spring, Severns, Perlmutter, Conroy. We have the Roe v.
Wade"0 and Doe v. Bolton" decisions of the Supreme Court.
These are but the protruding tips of the icebergs.
Together these factors affect the very matrix of the healing profession. This matrix roots in the conviction that patient-management decisions must be tailor-made to the individual, to the individual's condition and values. They are
personal decisions that must fit the individual like a glove to a
hand. Yet the three factors mentioned above are rather impersonal factors. When they begin to pre-program our treatment, they tend to depersonalize that treatment. There are
those who argue that "fixing" occurs in hospitals but that
genuine healing occurs elsewhere. This drift touches every
problem area and limits the available responses by framing
the questions one-sidedly. Adverting to this problem may be
half its solution, just as inadvertence will only compound it.
II.

THE MARKET-DRIVEN SYSTEM

By "market-driven," I mean institutions whose existence
and policies are heavily controlled by the economic factor.
The environment of the contemporary Catholic health care
facility is competitive. The signs of this are multiple. Hospitals have marketing officers. They experience pressure from
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), which will increasingly feel pressure from Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs). They have a keen eye on Diagnosis-Related
Groups (DRGs). They are increasingly all but forced into
joint ventures. Essential services do not support themselves.
The dumping syndrome is alive and well. Acquisition decisions, hiring practices and incentive proposals are often
straightforwardly market-related, etc.
At present, hospitals are literally slopping around in the
glare of three unanswered questions:
* What resources (time, energy, money) should be put into
health care and into other social goods (education, defense, environment, poverty elimination, etc.)?
10.
11.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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Within health care, how much time, energy, money should
go to preventive vs. crisis or rescue medicine?
" Within either category (prevention, rescue) who should receive resources when we cannot meet all needs?
Until such questions are answered, hospitals will continue to struggle as triage agents for Medicare, Medicaid,
DRGs, third-party payers, physicians, government pressures.
And of course, struggle means preoccupation and preoccupation means the subordination of mission to the economic factors that are its condition of possibility. "No margin, no mission." In such an atmosphere what is likely to inform or
shape reasoning?
"

III.

SECULARIZATION OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION

By "secularization" I mean the divorce of the profession
from a value tradition. Concretely, I refer to an increasing
independence from the values that make health care a human
service, one altruistically conceived and delivered. The factors
I have already discussed (depersonalization, market-driven
system) mean that physicians are enormously preoccupied
with factors peripheral to and distractive from holistic human
care. One fears that the result of this will be the gradual
transformation of medicine from a profession to a business.
We are already seeing this happening. This transformation
(already lodged in our language: provider, consumer) means
that medical judgments will increasingly be penetrated by
and even controlled by business principles. When this happens we will be the sad witnesses to the loss of soul by a noble
profession. And from my perspective in these remarks we will
witness the transformation of a notion ("the Christian physician") into an oxymoron.
In this issue of the Journal, Dr. William Roper, the administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration
which oversees the vast Medicare and Medicaid programs,
documents the increasing cost of medical care. Dr. Roper's
prescription for curing this malady is market-based, believing
that competition not only contains costs, but also preserves
quality. Moving the discussion to questions of ethics, law professor Barry Furrow posits the need for a new "advocacy beneficence" which would strengthen the moral, fiduciary obligations of doctor to patient in light of new methods of
delivering health care. Authors Sharkey and Buckle from
Johns Hopkins are especially concerned with the impact of
the prospective payment system on the frail elderly. Building
on recent Pennsylvania legislation, these authors would re-
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calibrate the prospective payment system to make it sensitive
not just to the cost, but also the effectiveness of the services
rendered. The essay by former Colorado Governor Lamm
provokes a re-examination of whether extraordinary health
expenditures can be justified in light of scarce resources.
Lamm is skeptical of what he calls the "mindless" pursuit of
medical technology at any cost. James Schepers, a present
third year student, addresses costs associated with a particular
form of malpractice. Finally, recent law school graduate
Nancy Burke attempts to apply the religious obligation of being a "healing force" to evaluate the sufficiency of Health
Maintenance Organizations for providing assistance to the
poor.
The articles and essays included in this issue are thus
quite diverse. These prefacing remarks, therefore, are a kind
of plea: that as readers study the rich and provocative studies
in this volume they never lose sight of the fact that reason
can be informed by many influences, but that from the Catholic Christian Ethical perspective it ought to be informed by
faith. When it is not, we have something other than Christian
ethics. And that "something other" erodes not only faith, but
if Catholic tradition is correct, as I firmly believe it is
our humanity.

